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Abstract—Vehicles in intelligent transport systems (ITS) react
to an emergency situation by broadcasting critical messages like
Decentralized Environmental Notification Messages (DENMs).
A digital signature is attached to each message to secure the
integrity of communication, and this message is inoperative
until the authentication completes. This creates a challenge for
vehicles to verify massive messages in some scenarios where it
could incur the thundering herd in authentication, if there is
a critical situation happening in heavy road traffic. To address
this problem, we propose ATHENA, a pagerank-based scheme
to solve the thundering herd in ITS authentication that utilises
the transmission of messages and pagerank algorithm to rank
the broadcasting vehicles. Simulation results show the efficiency
of ATHENA and the effectiveness of performance enhancements
compared with others.
Index Terms—ITS, Authentication, Security;
I. INTRODUCTION
ITS plays a vital role in the future traffic system, for it
can fundamentally enhance the safety and efficiency of the
road traffic. Vehicles and road side units (RSUs) equipped
with multiple sensors (like 3-D lidar, radar, stereo camera and
laser) can effectively detect their surrounding environment [1]
[2]. Additionally, the equipped on-board units (OBUs) with
multiple type of network interface (e.g., DSRC, Wifi and
cellular) support them to communicate with others promotely
by constantly broadcasting messages [3], which facilitates
vehicles and RSUs to extend their capabilities beyond the non-
line-of-signt (NLOS). Due to the importance of the exchanging
messages, they are an easy target for malicious attackers [4].
Therefore, authentication is a core procedure for message
communication. Each message has attached an additional
digital signature to guarantee the intactness and security, and
each participant, vehicle or RSU, cannot access this message
until the verification of messages has completed.
In order to achieve road safety within ITS, ETSI has recom-
mended Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
to generate the signature and verify these signatures [5].
Each vehicle will react and broadcast at most 10 DENMs
per second to others [6], if this vehicle detects a critical
situation. Consequently, there are thousands of DENMs to
be verified per second, creating a form of the well-known
“thundering herd” problem. In Fig 1, a road hazard happens
in a highway roundabout with the heavy traffic at the central
area, all surrounding vehicles and RSUs equipped with sensors
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Fig. 1: The exemplar of thundering herd in ITS
detect this and immediately broadcast DENMs to others, and
other vehicles also will verify and broadcast these messages
once they have been notified. To explore the authentication
cost in details, we have evaluated the signature and verification
in ECDSA-256 from the ETSI standards at different hardware
configurations (OBU ARM v7, Intel i3 and i5) in the Table I.
Hardware ECDSA_sign (ms) ECDSA_verify (ms)
OBU-ARMv7 27.9 33.7
Intel-i3 10.2 14.6
Intel-i5 5.46 7.32
TABLE I: The comparisons of ECDSA on different hardwares
Furthermore, we have measured the loss ratio due to a slow
verification compared to the required requirements (10 DENM
per second). In Fig 2-(1), with the increasing number of
vehicles, the loss ratios of verification become more noticeable
in three configurations. For the OBU and Intel-i3, for example,
the loss ratio reaches around 50% if there are more than 15
vehicles, which is gradually getting higher with increasing
vehicles. Despite some queueing approaches [7] [8] to queue
the received messages for 100 ms can mitigate this as in Fig 2-
(2), it cannot change the fact that total time cost for verifying
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Fig. 2: The loss ratio of authentication messages
all messages is still constant and the improvement of loss
ratio is not that significant for the overall. Additionally, when
the thundering herd happens, other messages, like Cooperative
Awareness Messages (CAMs), are being jammed and become
more difficult to received and processed by vehicles.
In the rest of this paper, we propose a new pagerank-based
authentication scheme, ATHENA, to address this problem.
Section II describes the comparison of other approaches and
the motivation of pagerank algorithm, and we present the
overview of ATHENA in Section III. The evaluated results are
discussed in Section IV and the conclusion is in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of schemes have been proposed to reduce ver-
ification processing overhead [5], [7]–[9]. They are mainly
based on the queuing approach as a buffer where received
messages can be prioritised or scheduled by a predefined order.
[5] chooses a random order for the verification to reduce the
congestion, whilst [9] [8] prioritise the verification based on
the distance between transmitter and receiver. Although [7]
adopts the Markov model to adjust the order of verification
based on critical situations amongst different physical areas,
the overall verification time cost for all messages is still
unchanged as we mentioned in Section I. Massive broadcast
is inevitably happening in the real world traffic, authentication
solely relying on the queueing is incapable of processing the
thundering herd problem and it causes unnecessary accidents.
[10] proposed the pagerank algorithm as a powerful tool
to rank web pages in the Internet. It constructs each web page
as a vertex in a directed graph, and the hyper-links point into
a web page as incoming edges, whilst the hyper-links that
point from a web page to other web page are represented as
outgoing edges. The rank of a web page thus can be inferred
from these incoming and outgoing edges. The value of a rank
is determined by its linked web pages and the initial quality of
itself, then iteratively computes it by the Eq 1, where N is the
number of web pages, Ein(pi) is the number of incoming edges
for web page pi, Eout(pj) is the number of outgoing edges
for web page pj . There are Ein(pi)(pi = p1, p2, · · · , pEin)
edges that point out to web page pi from other pages. PR(pi)
represents the page rank value for pj and the initial quality of
a web page is the initial PR value, which is defined as 1N . The
damping factor is denoted as d, which is usually recommended
as 0.85 to make sure the iteration is convergent.
PR(pi) =
1− d
N
+ d
∑
Ein(pi)
PR(pj)
Eout(pj)
(1)
III. AN OVERVIEW OF ATHENA
A. Standardised messages in the thundering herd
ETSI defines the emergency messages as DENM [6]. A
signed DENM contains the basic information for message
timestamps, payload data and the digital signature, etc. The
payload data, which is the core element for a DENM, is
comprised of four containers for different aspects.
The situation container and the location container are the
two key containers for ATHENA. The former container records
the type of the detected event and the information quality,
which is generated at the application level and it ranges from 7
as the highest to 1, the lowest of information quality regarding
to the accuracy of a detecting event. The latter has the
information of event location as a trace, which refers to a set of
consecutive path point positions leading to the event position.
Other two containers, the management container and the a
la carte container have the basic management information
related to DENM management and validity of duration or other
specific information have not included in other containers. We
implemented our proposed protocol in the negation flag from
the management container, which has the highest priority level
that can stop broadcasting DENMs.
B. ATHENA protocol
Signed DENMs are received, verified and forwarded
amongst vehicles, and they will arrive at the closest RSU,
eventually. The proposed ATHENA at RSU then constructs
the communication graph based on the set of point positions
in all its received messages from the location container, this
communication graph is applied for the pagerank algorithm to
determine the top rank of vehicles to generate DENMs.
Protocol 1 ATHENA at vehicle side
1: procedure BROADCASTING
2: while DENM signal == True do
3: while negation flag 6= True do
4: for mi ∈ ~Mi do
5: a score of information quality to mi
6: ECDSA sign(mi)
7: signed ~Mi broadcast to neighbours.
8: no more DENMs are generated or broadcasted.
As we displayed in Protocol 1 for the vehicle side, once a
vehicle detects the emergency signal to generate DENMs, it
will go to check its negation flag. If the negation flag is not
true, this vehicle will generate 10 DENMs per second that each
one of them has a score of information quality regarding to
43
5
9
2
1
710
8
6
0.015
0.018
0.018
0.231
0.113
0.209
0.13
0.225
0.021
0.024
Fig. 3: The graph of DENMs communication
this situation to be broadcasting. For these generated DENMs,
a digital signature generated by ECDSA will be assigned to
broadcast from line 4 to 7. Otherwise, if this vehicle received
the notification of negation flag with its unique id, which will
immediately stop the vehicle to generate DENMs. This vehicle
then only receives or forward incoming DENMs, because RSU
has determined another suitable vehicles to broadcast DENMs.
Next, we define ATHENA protocol at RSU side. Since
the RSU constantly receives messages from its surrounding
vehicles, once the number of received messages per second
has reached a predefined threshold, which can dynamically be
adjusted based on the capability of verification. It will trigger
ATHENA protocol at RSU side to build the communication
graph, G, for all received messages. Then we can compute
the highest rank vehicles by Eq 1. And this message will
broadcast the unique id of selected high ranking vehicles and
the negation flag to all other vehicles to execute Protocol 1.
C. Pagerank for the broadcasting vehicles
Pagerank algorithm is to measure the importance of broad-
casting vehicles based on their connections. The most widely
used approach to represent the connection relationships is the
graph model, and the graph is built as G = (V,E) where V is
the vertices set and E is the edge set. Consequently, vehicles or
RSUs are represented by vertices, and the path of transmitted
DENMs amongst vehicles are denoted as edges.
When DENMs finally arrived at a vehicle or a RSU from an
“eyewitness” vehicle, they already have been transmitted and
forwarded by a path of other vehicles at different positions,
which is recorded by the trace in the location container.
This is analogous to the hyper-link pointing to a web page
from another web page, the received vehicle has a trace path
pointing to the original sending vehicle. Like the blue vertices
1 to 5 in Fig 3, they are 5 original eyewitness vehicles to
broadcast DENMs to their neighbours. The rest of vertices,
as the rest of vehicles received and forwarded the emergency
information from those original eyewitnesses. For example, the
edge from vertex 8 to vertex 1, indicates the transmission of
emergency messages to vehicles 8 is received from vehicle 1.
The red vertex 10 represents the RSU that can construct this
communication graph based on the location container from
all received DENMs. Therefore, the number of “eyewitness”
vehicles (blue vertices) starting to broadcast DENMs are
analogous to the potential web pages to be ranked, and the
task of finding the highest ranking “eyewitness” vehicles to
broadcast thus is equal to find the top ranking web pages from
all web pages. After this graph is built, we can apply Eq. 1
by [11] to calculate the relative ranking value for each vertex
as shown in Fig 3 and broadcast the top ranking vehicles to
rest of vehicles. The time complexity of pagerank algorithm
is O(n+E), where n is the number of vertices and E is the
number of edges.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
We developed the simulation model to analyse the efficiency
and effectiveness of ATHENA. This simulation is used for
the transmission and verification of signed messages amongst
vehicles. Each vehicle generates 10 signed messages per
second based on ETSI standards. We have evaluated ECDSA-
256 algorithm to sign and verify a secured message based on
Table I. In the realistic scenario, specialised hardware security
module or trusted platform module are adopted to improve
the cryptographic operations by using higher CPU rather than
directly using OBU [12]. For generality, we choose Intel-i3
as our specialized hardware security module for signing and
verifying.
To simulate the thundering herd, we choose the roundabout
scenario as shown in Fig 1. Assuming there are 100 vehicles
and RSUs randomly distributed in this roundabout and a
percentage of vehicles are the first eyewitnesses detecting an
emergency to broadcast DENMs.
B. The comparison of ATHENA with the Oracle
We first evaluate the differences between the information
quality by adopting a few of highest ranking vehicles and the
information quality of top ranking of vehicles to the Oracle,
which we regard as the ideal, where a vehicle has 7, the highest
information quality.
We ran the simulation by 500 times, and a random commu-
nication graph amongst all connecting elements is generated at
each experiment. Then, we evaluated an increasing percentage
of vehicles as the first eyewitnesses broadcast to represent the
differences between top ranking vehicles and the Oracle in
the Fig 4. The lower part of the main box represents the 25-
percentile, the upper part is 75-percentile, and the orange line
is the median. The lower whisker is the 5-percentile, and the
upper one is the 95-percentile, and the green bullet is the mean
for 500 simulations. It is reasonable that the more top ranking
vehicles broadcast DENMs, the higher information quality can
achieve, the less information quality differences compared to
the Oracle. When we choose top 10 highest ranking vehicles
to broadcast, the differences are already zero, so we have not
listed the results of rank beyond 10. However, we can see the
results from top 3 ranking appear to be remarkably close at
all three different percentages of eyewitnesses. 75 percentile,
median and mean differences are less than 1, and 5 and 25
percentile of differences are zero, which means no information
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Fig. 4: The comparison of top rank with the Oracle
quality loss between the Oracle and it is empirically the best
choice.
C. The performance improvements achieved by ATHENA
The experiments in this subsection investigate the perfor-
mance improvements achieved by ATHENA in different fields.
Due to the results that we represented in Fig 2, the loss ratio
of verification is considerably growing with the increasing
number of vehicles. On the another hand, ATHENA is capable
of having more vehicles broadcasting without any loss ratio.
This is because ATHENA tames the thundering herd for only
the highest 3 vehicles broadcasting, which is totally acceptable
for most scenarios.
Therefore, in Fig 5, we displayed the number of duplicate
messages have been reduced by ATHENA choosing top rank-
ing 3 from 10 seconds to 5 minutes. The longer broadcast
lasts, the more duplicate messages have been reduced, which
explains the significant saving from the verification on the
vehicles side.
V. CONCLUSION
We have described a pagerank-based scheme to solve the
thundering herd problem in ITS authentication. ATHENA
utilises the path of locations to convert it as a graph model,
and we use the pagerank algorithm to determine the highest
rank vehicles to broadcast. We have evaluated the results of
a few number of highest ranking vehicles are almost identical
to the results of all vehicles in the same scenario to broadcast,
and it improves the loss ratio of verification and shows a large
number of verified messages have been reduced.
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